Some of the papers in this special issue were initially presented at a September 2016 conference on Global Labor Markets organized by the IMF, Policy Center for the New South and Brunel University, while others were commissioned through a call for papers. Funding for this initiative was provided in part through the IF-DFID program on Macroeconomic Research in Low Income Countries. Views expressed in this introduction and in the papers are those of the authors and should not be ascribed to the IMF or DFID.

Income inequality is high in Morocco. In 2013, the share of national income1  of the richest 10% in Morocco stood at nearly 32%, 12 times higher than the share of national income of the poorest 10% of the population. This paper argues that, drawing on international experience, there is much more that Morocco’s government can do to reduce inequality while at the same time enhancing growth and – possibly – doing so in a manner that is budget-neutral or even budget-positive. Top of the list are reform of Morocco’s dysfunctional educational system, and action to promote the participation of women in the labor force. Insufficient numbers of qualified workers are a key constraint on Morocco’s growth and more Moroccan women are qualified and free to work. Availability of health services needs to be more equitable across Morocco’s regions and social classes, enhancing not only the quality of life but also productivity. Morocco’s tax system can be made more progressive, inclusive and efficient, i.e. without unduly affecting incentives to work and invest. Increased competition in key sectors would both promote equality and stimulate growth. Actions to reduce corruption could have similar effects. Far better access to data on tax collection and household surveys would greatly improve understanding of inequality in Morocco and is essential for an effective government response.

The inclusion of young people and women is a major concern in several Mediterranean countries, particularly in the South and South-East. The labour markets of the countries on this shore share a number of features that exacerbate the difficulties of social and, above all, professional integration. In this regard, we cite the low demand for labour -which remains crucial in a context of advanced demographic transition- due in particular to the low employment growth, which has multiple origins, including the structure of the economies, their competitiveness and their weak economic and financial integration, at regional and global levels.

Plenary VI: The Digital Age and the Modern Social Contract. Moderator: Uduak Amimo, Consultant, Uduak Amimo Consulting Speakers: Jamira Burley, Head of Youth Engagement and Skills, Global Business Coalition for Education Sunjoy Joshi, Chairman, Observer Research Foundation Enrique Mendizabal, Founder and director, On Think Tanks Lex Paulson, Attorney, Professor, Sciences PO Paris

This brief argues for a pan-African food security initiative that would: 1). encourage free trade in food products between African countries; 2). promote multi-country regional investments in infrastructure to enhance agricultural productivity and resilience to climate change; 3). support public-private partnerships to establish fertilizer factories across the continent; 4). create an African council responsible for coordinating and encouraging agricultural research and development; and 5). support a facility that would ensure vulnerable African countries can finance food imports in times of crisis.

Addressing the increasing demands for water, energy, and food requires a coherent methodology to ensure that  societies have access to them and that conflict over them is avoided. For example, agriculture and food production  require water and energy; energy production also requires water and, in some instances, agricultural products.  Water distribution and treatment can be very energy intensive. Therefore, the benefits of approaching the Water- Energy-Food (WEF) nexus in an integrated way are gaining popularity. The public sector, the private sector, civil  society, combined with the geopolitical and socio-economic-climatic environment are all interactors that form a  complex web in the management of these fundamental resources. The MENA region relies heavily on international  trade to ensure national food and nutrition securities and, with world crises and changing global landscapes, this  has  created  a  concern  among  nations  as  to  whether  it  is  sustainable  or  focusing  on  creating  greater  food  self- sufficiency is a better alternative. This policy brief illustrates the use of computer decision support systems (DSS)  to aid in the understanding of the WEF nexus with a particular focus on evaluating food production for trade or  for self-sufficiency.

Addressing the increasing demands for water, energy, and food requires a coherent methodology to ensure that  societies have access to them and that conflict over them is avoided. For example, agriculture and food production  require water and energy; energy production also requires water and, in some instances, agricultural products.  Water distribution and treatment can be very energy intensive. Therefore, the benefits of approaching the Water- Energy-Food (WEF) nexus in an integrated way are gaining popularity. The public sector, the private sector, civil  society, combined with the geopolitical and socio-economic-climatic environment are all interactors that form a  complex web in the management of these fundamental resources. The MENA region relies heavily on international  trade to ensure national food and nutrition securities and, with world crises and changing global landscapes, this  has  created  a  concern  among  nations  as  to  whether  it  is  sustainable  or  focusing  on  creating  greater  food  self- sufficiency is a better alternative. This policy brief illustrates the use of computer decision support systems (DSS)  to aid in the understanding of the WEF nexus with a particular focus on evaluating food production for trade or  for self-sufficiency.

We are living through unprecedented times. The COVID-19 pandemic threatens not only our health, but the very foundation of life itself: our food security. Now more than ever, we are forced to rethink our food security as we witness the widespread dislocations to our food system, forcing millions to beg for food for the first time. During normal times, our world produces enough nutritious food for all but millions still go hungry every day. Why does this happen and what can be done to end this scourge? Nearly 75 years after the end of the Second World War, since when many countries have pursued policies to achieve food security, it is befitting to take stock and ask ourselves what has been achieved, at what cost, and what have we learnt that can help us better thrive in a post COVID-19 pandemic world. Many countries, with different political systems, and at different levels of development, have equated food security with food self-sufficiency (FSS) and/or food sovereignty (FSY). The common element in these countries’ approaches is the belief that producing domestically all of the nation’s consumption of basic food makes a country food secure: the country retains control over its food supply and therefore is not vulnerable to the vagaries of international trade, in particular import price spikes, political economy disruptions, and natural and man-made (including public health) disasters elsewhere in the world. FSS has been equated with national security itself. In distinguishing means versus ends, FSS is a means of achieving the end or the desired state, which is food security. FSY is also concerned with retaining control, but in this case, it also includes control over a country’s preferred approach to agricultural and food policies. FSY asserts that the country does not want its food supply and its agro-food policy approach to be subjugated to foreign corporate interests. In both FSS and FSY, the use of trade protection in some form is central.

Ensuring food security for a growing population is one of the major challenges of the coming decades. The scarcity of natural resources, the negative impact of climate change on agricultural production, and the rapid urbanization are all among many other factors that threaten food security worldwide. Given that several million people in the world already suffer from undernourishment and malnutrition, it is necessary today to adopt adequate policies to meet food demand in each country. In light of these observations, Isabelle Tsakok, Senior Fellow at the Policy Center for the New South, explains in depth the concept of food security and outlines major factors that undermine food security.

In a conversation with PCNS Columnist Helmut Sorge, Eniola Mafe who is a strategist, international development leader, Founder at Eniola Mafe Advisory, lead of 2030 Vision Initiative and Atlantic Dialogues Emerging Leaders alumna discusses the existing solutions for Africa's food crisis, the untapped potential of agriculture on the continent and how technology and its democratization could be the solution to Africa's agricultural hardships.

Traders have worried that the war involving Russia and Ukraine could stoke inflation, further disrupt supply chains and derail the global economic recovery. Scarcity of food has led to rising prices within the conflict zone and elsewhere in the world. Both local and global markets are stressed because food demand is high while supply has been restricted. Rising food prices mean rising food insecurity. In this podcast, Dr. Rabi Mohtar & Dr. Isabelle Tsakok, both Senior Fellows at the Policy Center, discuss the effects of the conflict on food security, and the possible ways to mitigate these effects in the medium and long term. 

Events in the Sahel, and Mali especially, are taking an uncertain and worrying turn. Mali witnessed two coups d’état in less than a year, while the West African Sahel went through its most violent year yet and there are no signs that the violence is slowing down. In the midst of this unprecedented instability, recent developments involving Mali’s transitional government and the international community, France in particular, provide no assurances that things are likely to improve anytime soon. Mali’s government is considering hiring the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company (PMC) better known for its human rights violations than anything else. If Bamako moves ahead with the plan, it could disrupt the country’s weak counterterrorism and stabilization efforts. The international community has pushed back, warning against such a move. While France, Mali’s key partner, has promised it will not abandon the country, it has already started vacating key bases in the north. Germany, an important contributor to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), has also warned against hiring the Russian PMC.

Almost ten years after the beginning of the security crisis in the Sahel, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger face a graver predicament than ever before. In the throes of multiple insurgencies, they and their foreign patrons, including France, have shown the limits of military containment. While these three countries are the victims of terrorist aggression, their crises also have deep domestic roots, including long-standing patterns of state abuses of their populations, even in the more democratic ones; neglect of governance responsibilities and very weak capacity to provide public goods, including security and justice; exclusionary politics whereby some communities find themselves systematically marginalized while others behave as the “owners” of the state, which feeds deep grievances against the state that jihadists exploit; and, finally, complacent political elites who are largely shielded from political accountability. To escape their predicament, Sahelian states must reinvent themselves in ways that build on their historical legacies, including Islam, rather than trying to mimic ill-fitting Western models. Donors can help by moving away from antiterror kinetic operations toward civilian protection and projects that better embed the state in local social relations and strengthen local communities in the face of difficult natural conditions.

The Sahel has become more prominent in policymaking circles because of its strategic importance and the urgent nature of the dangers that have become rife in the region. Unfortunately, countries in the Maghreb have been relatively sidelined in recent years despite their potential sizable role in stabilizing the region and spurring economic development. Therefore, the focus of this brief is to analyze the Maghreb’s outlook towards the Sahel, namely from the perspective of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania.
Morocco has strong geopolitical interests in the region which are becoming an international gateway for business in Africa, increasing support for its stance on its southern provinces, counterbalancing its neighbor Algeria, and countering terrorism through multilateral security collaboration with West African countries and other partners. For Algeria, the Sahel will remain an important focus point. President Tebboune’s February 2020 speech at the African Union (AU) and Lamamra’s appointment as Foreign Minister indicated a strategic shift based on a refocusing on Africa. The Algerian establishment has diverging interests which include limiting Morocco’s regional sway, protecting its borders and perceived sphere of influence (Libya, Mali, Niger), and attempting to remain an influential actor in the region. Lastly, Mauritania is a key actor in terms of the Maghreb’s outlook towards the Sahel. The pervasive issues the region faces will need multilateral efforts, and Mauritania is well-positioned to be both involved in security frameworks and international development strategies. Indeed, in the words of its President Ould Ghazouani, “the situation of the region requires larger cooperation.”
Overall, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania all have enduring historical, political, and economic ties with the Sahel. As the region has become subject to strong foreign influences, Maghreb countries also have, as presented in this policy paper, their own respective agendas and strategies.

In this episode of Africafé, Rida Lyammouri will talk about the ongoing conflicts in the Sahel, evoking the instability in Mali and Burkina Faso and suggests ways forward for greater engagement from the international community in helping fragile states in the region.

Violence is increasingly endangering the lives of populations throughout the Sahel. Amid this problematic situation, coup d’etats are multiplying. On January 23, a military coup d’etat was announced in Burkina Faso. What are the challenges that this new situation reinforces? How would the international community encounter these challenges and which actors are able to contribute to security in the region? Rida Lyammouri, senior fellow at the Policy Center, and specialist of the Sahel region, answers these questions in this podcast.

A summit on the African vision of Sahel’s future with a focus on development around the 5 Sahelian Ministers of Economy and the report “Sahel: Moving Beyond Military Containment”

President Trump may not enact his threatened US drawdown of troops from the Sahel, but President Biden will still face pressure to end America’s “forever wars” and reduce the number of American lives and treasure lost to fighting terrorism in Africa. If the United States pulls back from the Sahel, terrorist groups active there may seek to export unrest to more-secure coastal countries like Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Benin, and Togo. Can Europe fill the void? And will Russia, China, or other actors try to move in and assert their own influence in the region? Chair: Khalid Chegraoui, Senior Fellow, Policy Center for the New South TBC Speakers: . Pierre Englebert, H. Russell Smith Professor of International Relations, Pomona College; Senior Fellow, Africa Center, Atlantic Council . Rida Lyammouri, Senior Fellow, Policy Center for the New South . Abdoul Salam Bello, Senior Project Officer, United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification; Senior Fellow, Africa Center, Atlantic Council.

This year, the Conference of the Parties (COP27) will be held in in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. On the outset of this auspicious occasion, it is befitting to reflect upon contemporary climate adaptation and mitigation policies, from a southern and African point of view. Indeed, climate change is one of the stickiest policy problems of the 21st century, because it is inherently a global and multidimensional problem entailing a bundle of policy features. Following the consecutives shocks to the global economy caused by fossil fuels, the timing has never been better to melt the polarization around climate change politics and propose innovative solutions to surf the uncertainty and complexity of this intractable policy problem.

The world faces a huge shortage of infrastructure investment relative to its needs. With few exceptions, such as China, this shortage is even greater in non-advanced countries.

The G20 Infrastructure Investors Dialogue estimated the volume of global infrastructure investment needed by 2040 to be $81 trillion, $53 trillion of which is needed in non- advanced countries (OECD 2020). The Dialogue projected a gap – in other words, a shortfall in relation to the investments foreseen today – of around $15 trillion worldwide, $10 trillion of which is in non-advanced economies.

2020 is an important year for the international climate agenda despite a general loss of momentum and resurgence of the divide between traditional polluters, emerging polluters, and the most vulnerable countries. While African countries only contribute to 4% of global GHG emissions, their capacity to adapt to climate change’s devastating impact on societies, livelihoods, economies, and ecosystems is limited. This paper provides a synthesis of the existing literature and recent developments related to Africa’s position in international climate negotiations. It also provides policy recommendations for African countries to claim a stronger voice and ensure that their priorities (climate finance, technology transfer and capacity building) are better reflected in the international climate regime.

One aim of COP27 was to persuade countries to make commitments to reduce emissions and earmark resources for technologies to be transferred from industrialized states to less developed states. Hovering over the COP27 was the reluctance of wealthy states to live up to their 2009 commitment to provide $100 billion to poor countries, financial assistance for adaptation (as opposed to just mitigation projects), and more compensation for what the Paris Agreement termed “loss and damage,” that is recompense for destruction already wrought by climate change. This year’s gathering is the first where “funding arrangements” for “loss and damage” were included on the agenda, to the displeasure of the US and European Union who fear liability.

In the current context of persistent inflationary pressures and growing uncertainties about the economic outlook, many central banks have mainly focused on their mandate of price stability through more aggressive monetary policies. In addition, the growing concerns linked to climate change and inequalities have shaped the policy discussions related to expanding the traditional mandates of central banks (price stability and/or maximum sustainable employment) to take into account major ethical issues in the design and implementation of monetary policies such as climate change and inequalities. In this podcast, Otaviano Canuto, senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South, shares his insights on the role of central banks in the current context and whether they should expand the monetary policy toolkit to include climate change and inequalities.

Climate change is the defining issue of our time. The last decade was the hottest in human history and has seen an increase in natural disasters. These shocks not only damage the environment on which humans depend, but they weaken political, economic, and social systems as well. Tackling climate change requires unparalleled levels of global cooperation. It will compel countries to question their economic models, invent new industries and recognize the moral responsibility that wealthy nations have to the rest of the world, thus placing a value on nature that “goes far beyond money.” One way to combat climate change and reduce the drain on our planet’s resources is to shift to systems that utilize sustainable energy. Renewable energy minimizes carbon pollution and has a much lower impact on our environment. While it will cost money to shift to renewable energy, it will cost much more in the long run if the world fails to do so: Given the current uncertain global context resulting from the health crisis, are countries committed enough in the battle against climate change? How can countries lower the cost of the transition to low-carbon sources of energy? What are the significant policies needed to foster the use of sustainable energy? To pursue its battle against climate change, the EU has introduced a carbon border adjustment mechanism as part of its “Fit for 55” package. What are the possible implications of such mechanisms? Are carbon taxes an adequate tool to incentivize countries to decarbonize? Moderator: Uduak Amimo, Journalist and Consultant, Uduak Amimo Coaching and Consulting, Kenya Speakers: - Nchimunya Hamukoma, Research Manager, Harambee Youth Employment Accelerator (ADEL) - Sunjoy Joshi, Chairman, Observer Research Foundation, India - Mari Luomi, Research Fellow, KAPSARC - Saïd Mouline, CEO, Moroccan Agency for Energy Efficiency AMEE

In the last few months, the global order has been going through some fundamental changes which are affecting the competition between the great powers and have a direct impact on their relations with regional partners. Emerging challenges such as the climate change, cyberwarfare and artificial intelligence, hybrid warfare and non-state actors are shaping a new world that is profoundly different compared to the post-9/11 era, where the war on terrorism opened the gates to what have been successfully described as ‘forever wars’, which have forced the US and its allies to be engaged in the greater Middle East indefinitely.

The energy sector has undergone major transitions from the use of wood as a dominant fuel to the adoption of coal and, more recently, oil. In the 21st century gas has grown faster than any other fossil fuel and today renewable energy is growing even faster. The changes, combined with volatile energy prices and occasional shocks, create complex scenarios for the future of the energy sector. This has numerous implications, not only for the socio-economic development of NATO’s southern neighbourhood, and Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries in particular, but also for energy security. Policymakers in the region should keep an eye on the current megatrends in the energy sector, and the short-term implications of one-off shocks like COVID-19, in order to define long-term strategies for a resilient energy sector.

NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) is a forum for cooperation launched in 1994 for non-NATO members from Mediterranean countries. It currently involves Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia. The 2004 Istanbul Heads of State NATO Summit gave new impetus to the dialogue by enhancing the level of partnership. Since then, many observers note its difficulty to position itself among other political initiatives that are multiplying in the Mediterranean. For our part, we argue that despite the imperfections of the MD, it is still an evolving process; like any institutional process, this dialogue is a process following phases and steps with achievements, inconsistencies and limitations that require a common reflection and debate on effective responses to correct defects and improve cooperation.

Plenary III: Can Nato Survive the Shifting Geopolitical Order? Moderator Kimberly Dozier, CNN & Daily Beast Contributor Speakers Michelle Ndiaye, Director Africa Peace, and Security Programme, Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, Former Foreign Minister, Republic of Mauritania J. Peter Pham, United States Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa; Vice President for Research and Regional Initiatives; Director, Africa Center, Atlantic Council Bruno Tertrais, Deputy Director, Foundation for Strategic Research Joao Vale de Almeida, Ambassador Head of Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations

In July 2017, the OCP Policy Center published a collective work entitled Social Cohesion, Institutions and Public Policies directed by Professor Abdallah Saaf, Senior Fellow at OCP Policy Center. This publication is the result of reflections and discussions exchanged during a conference organized on Thursday, October 27, 2016, and which subsequently were transposed into written contributions. On this occasion, the authors set out to shed light on the concept of "social cohesion" by examining its history, implications as well as its implementation in various chapters. As Morocco grows economically, social demands are also rising, thus requiring social cohesion, as a guarantor of social peace. This Policy Brief aims to revisit the concept of social cohesion, its origin in sociology, to briefly present the societal evolution of Morocco and finally, to highlight the key ideas developed in the book.

Scholars of social movements and global protest have long neglected social movements in Africa, ostensibly because African societies are too rural, too tradition- or ethnicity-bound, or lacking advanced class formations. Those who have broached the topic tend to focus on South Africa’s labor movement and anti-apartheid struggle. Even less addressed is how social movements in various parts of the continent have affected each other. A continent-wide approach however shows that protests in sub-Saharan Africa preceded the North African uprisings, by almost a decade. These protests had similar objectives and faced comparable obstacles, yet much of the scholarship on the “Arab Spring” has ignored the sub-Saharan connections and precedents. How did these movements build on earlier waves of political agitation? How do these “protest coalitions” combine political and economic motivations?

Africa is acutely affected by the ongoing global democratic recession. In 2020, a military coup took place in Mali. In 2021, four African countries – Chad, Mali, Guinea, and Sudan - experienced military takeovers. Thus far, in 2022, two coups have occurred in Burkina Faso and an attempted one in Guinea Bissau. Yet polling data and activism on the ground shows African youth believe in and are prepared to fight for democracy.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed flaws in healthcare systems around the world. Despite the inequalities between the different countries in the strength of these systems and the social safety nets, the common observation is that we must rethink social contracts and the relationship between states and their citizens. This renewal of this relationship is based mainly on the quality of services provided by the State and the reform of health systems so that it can withstand future shocks. Nonetheless, we should also take a look on the nature of interactions between citizens and decision-makers. Globally, populations have opposed the coercive methods used by states to impose confinements and mandatory vaccinations, in this context, the issue of trust between states and citizens is at the heart of the overhaul of Post Covid Social Contracts. How can we build an inclusive social contract after what the pandemic has revealed the flaws inside our systems? How does international cooperation impact the national debates on social contracts? Do states have to create global surveillance systems in order to ensure citizen’s well-being? Moderator: James Mcgann, Director, Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program Speakers: - Tosin Duratoye, Principal, Conselia Advisory Practice (ADEL) - Bushra Ebadi, Network Coordinator, Data-driven Surveillance Technologies & Migration Amnesty International (ADEL) - Serigne Gueye Diop, Minister Advisor to the President ; Mayor of Sandiara, Senegal - Ignacio Walker, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chile

As Asia rises, the world liberal order is slowly cracking. Democracy – a universal goal for humankind – has also been failing in delivering better welfare to the populations. Western values have influenced the world for the last three hundred years. However, steadily, the West is becoming less relevant, and its values seem to be criticised and inappropriate to catapult the West into a more prominent role. What to expect? Can the West recover lost ground? Will Western values be resilient? Moderator : Mohammed Loulichki, Senior Fellow, Policy Center for the New South Speakers : - Bineta Diop, Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security, African Union Commission - Trisha Shetty, Founder & CEO, SheSays - Ignacio Walker, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chile - Thomas Richter, Director, Berlin & Brussels, Avisa Partners (Emerging Leader).

Moderator Borzou Daragahi, International Correspondent, The Independent Speakers Laura Albornoz, Former Minister of State for the National Service for Women, Chile Mohamed Benaïssa, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Morocco Michelle Ndiaye, Director of the Africa Peace and Security Program, Institute for Peace and Security Studies – IPSS Trisha Shetty, Founder & CEO, SheSays.

Emerging market and developing economies (EMDE) face a common set of external shocks: rising energy and food prices; tightening in global financial conditions caused by the prospect of sharper interest rate hikes and anticipation of "quantitative tightening"; and return of restrictions on mobility in China, on account of the Covid zero policy, leading to slumping in growth and weakening one of the primary growth drivers for the other EMDE. However, the impacts of those common shocks on EMDE have been heterogeneous.

There is an international movement to tighten monetary and fiscal policies as a response to the global inflation phenomenon. Accordingly, global economic growth projections for 2022 and 2023 have been revised downward. As inflation will decline only gradually, given the price stickiness of its core components, there is likely to be momentarily a situation of stagflation, i.e. a combination of significant inflation and low or negative GDP growth.

We discuss how the current global stagflation experience might develop into one of a soft landing, a sharp downturn, or a deep recession. The evolution will depend on how fast inflation responds downward to economic deceleration. We therefore suggest framing the response in terms of assessing to where major economies’ Phillips curves have shifted.

Phillips-curve shifts will also reflect cross-border repercussions of country-specific policy choices. Furthermore, sudden abrupt deteriorations of financial conditions may cause additional moves in Phillips curves.